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Boon or Boondoggle?
The Debate Over State and Local 
Economic Development Policies
Over the past 20 years, governors and mayors have assumed respon 
sibility for economic development. While many regions have experienced 
high unemployment and declining real wages, federal action to deal with 
these economic problems has been constrained by budget deficits and 
a conservative political philosophy, and state and local governments 
have had to act. Almost every state and metropolitan area has expand 
ed the size and scope of economic development programs. More money 
is being spent on subsidies to new branch plants than ever before, and 
even conservative states have intervened in the private market by sub 
sidizing business research and industrial modernization, and by pro 
viding capital and business training to small business and entrepreneurs.
To most politicians, economic development means more jobs. More 
jobs are expected to bring many benefits: lower unemployment, higher 
wages, greater property values, increased profits for local businesses, 
more tax revenues, and reelection for the politician who can take credit 
for these boons. Politicians usually emphasize most the benefit of pro 
viding jobs for the unemployed.
But critics argue persuasively that state and local economic develop 
ment policies cannot achieve these benefits. According to the critics, 
economic development policies do not help the unemployed and the poor, 
but mostly benefit capitalists and the propertied. The indictment against 
state and local economic development policies has three parts. First, 
the policies are argued to have little effect on the growth of a small 
region such as a state or metropolitan area. Second, even if these policies 
could affect job growth, so many in-migrants would be attracted that 
the local unemployment rate would quickly return to its original level.
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Third, even if local growth lowered unemployment in one area, from 
a national perspective these benefits would be offset by increased 
unemployment in other areas.
This book presents evidence to counter these criticisms of state and 
local economic development policies. It argues that economic develop 
ment policies can significantly affect the growth of a state or metropolitan 
area, that increases in the growth of a local economy can benefit its 
unemployed, and that state and local economic development policies 
can benefit the overall national economy.
While the argument relies, in part, on my interpretation of previous 
research, I also present new empirical research on how metropolitan 
growth affects the unemployed, workers, and property owners. That 
research shows that faster growth of a metropolitan area has signifi 
cant long-run effects on its unemployment rate. Furthermore, faster 
growth leads to significant occupational upgrading to better jobs, par 
ticularly for minority and less-educated persons. Growth of a 
metropolitan area also increases its property values. But overall, the 
benefits of faster growth are probably distributed in a progressive man 
ner, that is, the real incomes of low-income persons increase by a greater 
percentage than those of upper-income persons.
This is not to imply that cutting business taxes to spur economic 
development is always the right policy. Public services to business also 
affect the economic growth of a local area. Depending on the cir 
cumstances, the labor market benefits of local economic growth may 
be outweighed by the costs of environmental damage due to growth 
and the costs of government resources devoted to economic develop 
ment programs.
Focus on Local Economies
To avoid confusion at the outset, my arguments for the potential 
benefits of state and local economic development programs are meant 
to be applied to programs that seek to affect growth for an entire small 
economic region, such as a state or a metropolitan area. l Programs aimed 
at individual towns or suburbs within a metropolitan area raise
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different issues. Metropolitan areas, or states, can legitimately be thought 
of as economic regions, because they have quasi-independent labor and 
housing markets. The trend in local economic development policy is 
towards metropolitan cooperation. In addition, states are increasingly 
prominent in organizing and financing economic development policy 
at all levels of government. Thus, the book addresses the types of state 
and local economic development policy that dominate the scene today 
and are likely to be even more important in the future.
What is Economic Development Policy?
Another source of confusion could be what is meant by "economic 
development policy." Growth and structural change in the economy 
of a state or local area are arguably affected by every government ac 
tion, from the quality of public schools to the regulation of optometrists. 
Economic development policies discussed here, however, are those that 
provide direct assistance to businesses. Direct economic development 
policies assist businesses with cash, such as tax subsidies, for exam 
ple, or with services, such as training individuals in how to develop 
a business plan for a new enterprise. Policies such as those related to 
public schools that indirectly affect economic development have broader 
purposes and are best evaluated from a broader perspective. This book 
focuses on direct economic development policies because their claim 
ed success in promoting economic growth is their main rationale. Fur 
thermore, economic development policies that assist businesses direct 
ly are politically controversial. Liberals are concerned that these policies 
give too much profit to business, while conservatives are concerned 
that these policies give too much power to government.
Table 1.1 lists the main types of direct economic development policies 
being pursued by state and local governments. These policies can be 
grouped into two types. Traditional economic development policies seek 
to provide financial and other incentives for businesses to locate and 
expand in an area. Most incentives are provided through the area's tax 
system and are targeted at attracting new manufacturing branch plants.
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Table 1.1
A Typology of State and Local Economic Development Policies 
that Directly Aid Businesses
Traditional Economic Development Policies 
(Primarily Targeted at Branch Plant Recruitment)
Marketing Area As Branch Plant Location
Industrial development advertising 
Marketing trips to corporate headquarters 





Provision of land at below-market prices
Direct state loans
Nonflnancial Incentives to Branch Plants
Customized industrial training
Expedited provision of site-specific infrastructure
Help with regulatory problems
"New Wave" Economic Development Policies 
(Primarily Targeted at Small or Existing Businesses)
Capital Market Programs
Predominantly government-financed loan or equity programs 
Government support for predominantly privately financed loan or 
equity programs
Information/Education for Small Business
Small business ombudsman/information office 
Community college classes in starting a business 
Small business development centers 
Entrepreneurial training programs 
Small business incubators
Research and High Technology
Centers of excellence in business-related research at public universities
Research-oriented industrial parks
Applied research grants
Technology transfer programs/industrial extension services
Export Assistance
Information/training in how to export 
Trade missions 
Export financing
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What I call "new wave" economic development policies are an eclec 
tic group of policies that became popular in many states during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. These policies encourage various forms of in 
novation, such as applied research, industrial modernization, en- 
trepreneurship, and business expansion into export markets. They also 
have in common a willingness to involve government much more with 
business decisions. Rather than just providing cash, they would have 
government provide services to businesses to help them determine their 
best market or technology.
Several prominent books on state and local economic development 
policies describe the many new wave policies and debate whether the 
new wave approach or the traditional approach is better. 2 While that 
debate is important, my focus in this book is on whether the general 
approach of assisting business for economic development purposes is 
likely to cause changes in business behavior that benefit other groups 
in society, and if so, who those groups are. All of the direct economic 
development policies have in common an attempt to reduce some sort 
of business costs, broadly defined. This even is true for new wave 
policies. For example, export information programs reduce the cost to 
businesses of acquiring information on markets in other countries; en 
trepreneurial training programs reduce the costs to potential entre 
preneurs of developing a business and financing plan; applied research 
grants reduce the costs to high technology companies of developing an 
innovative product. Furthermore, the issue of the overall desirability 
of business assistance for economic development logically needs to be 
resolved before the issue of which type of business assistance is most 
effective. If the entire philosophy behind direct economic development 
policies is flawed if these policies can only benefit the assisted 
businesses, or can only benefit property owners then the debate over 
different types of policies is pointless.
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Jobs Versus Other Goals 
of Economic Development Policies
The analysis of this study emphasizes one particular goal of direct 
economic development policies, the goal of more jobs for the state or 
local area. Some direct economic development policies have additional 
goals as well. For example, many of the new wave economic develop 
ment policies also aim at encouraging innovation.
Job creation is the primary goal for all direct economic development 
policies, traditional or new wave, from the perspective of politicians 
and voters. Governor Mario Cuomo of New York expressed the opin 
ion of many state and local political leaders and voters when he said 
that "while there are no panaceas, nothing comes closer than one sim 
ple word: jobs." 3 Advocates of new wave economic development 
policies may tout their innovation benefits, but the policies will face 
political death if they fail to increase job growth. 4
Despite all the publicity given new wave economic development 
policies, the evidence suggests that more resources are devoted to tradi 
tional policies whose primary goal is more jobs for the state or local 
area. Data from the National Association of State Development Agen 
cies indicate that expenditures by state development agencies totaled 
about $1.5 billion in 1990 (National Association of State Development 
Agencies, 1990). Much of this agency spending is devoted to traditional 
rather than new wave programs. A State of Minnesota survey suggests 
that state spending on high technology economic development totaled 
$550 million in 1988 (Minnesota Office of Science and Technology, 
1988). Some of this spending appears to be for university basic research, 
and there is overlap between the NASD A and Minnesota figures. But 
even if there were no overlap, and all of this $2 billion was devoted 
to new wave programs, these expenditures are dwarfed by the various 
tax subsidies, or "tax expenditures," that state and local governments 
give to business for economic development purposes. For example, in 
the State of Michigan alone, over $150 million annually is foregone 
from property tax abatements granted to businesses. 5 For just one 
manufacturing branch plant (albeit a large one), the General Motors
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Saturn plant, Tennessee state and local governments provided subsidies 
with a net present value of $144 million, mostly in the form of proper 
ty tax abatements. 6 Furthermore, in addition to these tax expenditures 
that are clearly linked to specific economic development projects, many 
of the recent tax reforms in the states have reduced business tax rates 
and provided business tax credits and deductions, largely on the rationale 
that these changes would help the business climate and promote economic 
development. 7 The "tax expenditures" caused by these development- 
oriented tax reforms vastly exceed what states spend on venture capital, 
entrepreneurial training, or other new wave economic development 
policies.
Do State and Local 
Economic Development Policies Affect Growth?
Financial subsidies ... are rarely a significant concern in wise 
business-location decisions and usually amount to little more than 
a government giveaway and burden on taxpayers, including cor 
porate taxpayers forced to subsidize their competitors. (Page 36 
in Leadership for Dynamic State Economics, Committee for 
Economic Development, 1986)
The first issue in analyzing state and local economic development 
policies is whether these policies have any significant effect on the job 
growth of an area. If they fail to increase job growth in the areas that 
adopt them, they cannot help the unemployed.
Many policy researchers have denounced the traditional economic 
development policies of tax and financial subsidies as ineffective in pro 
moting state or metropolitan area job growth. The usual theoretical argu 
ment for this position is that state and local taxes are too small a percent 
age of business costs to affect business growth decisions. The usual em 
pirical argument for this position relies on both surveys of business firms 
and econometric studies of the determinants of state or metropolitan 
area job growth. Surveys of business firms often show a low ranking 
of state and local taxes as a location determinant. Furthermore, until
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recent years, the overwhelming majority of econometric studies could 
find no significant statistical relationship between state and local business 
growth and state and local business taxes.
The theoretical argument that state and local business taxes are too 
small to affect business location is unpersuasive. Many states and 
metropolitan areas will be close substitutes from a business perspec 
tive, offering similar access to markets and supplies. Even small pro 
duction cost differentials could prove decisive for a particular business 
location decision.
The problem with surveys of location determinants is that the ques 
tions asked are difficult to interpret. These surveys ask the business 
to list the most important, or essential, or crucial determinants of its 
current location choice. What "important" means in this context is dif 
ficult to define. What we really want to know is whether a different 
location would have been chosen if state and local business taxes had 
been 5 percent higher, or 10 percent higher. Answering this question 
requires a quantitative weighing of this site's advantages versus alter 
native sites, and most businesses would be unable or unwilling to pro 
vide such precise answers to a survey.
Recent econometric evidence indicates that variations in state and local 
business taxes do have effects on state or metropolitan area growth that 
are likely to be considered significant by most policy makers. Difficult 
methodological problems plague the estimation of how taxes affect state 
and metropolitan area growth. No existing study escapes all these prob 
lems. But compared to earlier studies in this area, recent studies generally 
use better data and methodologies. Recent studies mostly agree that state 
and local business taxes affect the growth of an area, and even agree 
on the approximate magnitude of the effect.
Major public services that benefit business, such as improvement in 
public infrastructure, are also estimated to spur state or metropolitan 
area growth in many of the newer studies of business location. An 
economic development policy of business tax cuts may fail to increase 
jobs in a state or metropolitan area if it leads to a deterioration of public 
services to business. An economic development policy of tax increases 
may succeed in increasing jobs if it significantly improves public ser 
vices to business. Policymakers must consider both tax and public
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service effects on business if they are to successfully increase their area's 
job growth.
New wave regional economic development policies go beyond pro 
viding financial subsidies or general public services to providing specific 
services to small business and entrepreneurs. Many policy researchers 
who denounce state and local tax breaks are much more hopeful about 
these types of policies. At present, there is no good evidence on whether 
new wave economic development policies are effective. If new wave 
services have a higher value to business than their cost, they could have 
a greater effect on the growth of a state or metropolitan area, per dollar 
of government effort, than the more traditional business tax breaks. The 
cost effectiveness of state and local economic development policies is 
crucial to whether the policies make sense for a particular state or locality.
Does Local Growth Help the Unemployed 
and Lower-Income Households?
When jobs develop in a fast growing area, workers from other 
areas are attracted to fill the developing vacancies, thus preserv 
ing the same unemployment rate as before the growth surge. (John 
Logan and Harvey Molotch, Professors of Sociology at State 
University of New York at Albany and University of California- 
Santa Barbara, respectively, p. 89 in Urban Fortunes: The Political 
Economy of Place, 1987)
. . . the fortunes of numerous poor and unskilled urban residents 
of cities are often largely unaffected by even healthy expansion 
within local economies. (Page 5 in Urban America in the Eighties, 
Report of the Panel on Policies and Prospects for Metropolitan 
and Nonmetropolitan America, President's Commission for a Na 
tional Agenda for the Eighties, 1980)
The next issue is whether the ability of state and local economic 
development policy to affect local growth makes any difference. Sup 
pose some policy does increase job growth for a local economic region, 
such as a metropolitan area. The increase in local labor demand would
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be expected to lead to some short-term reduction in local unemploy 
ment and upward pressure on real wages. But if labor mobility is rapid 
enough, the increase in local labor demand will be quickly matched 
by an increase in local labor supply. The unemployment rate will in 
crease back to its original level, and the real wage will drop back to 
its original level.
Migration statistics indicate that the United States is a mobile enough 
society that labor market effects of faster local job growth could plausibly 
be very short-lived. For example, during a typical four-year period, 
over 13 percent of the population moves between metropolitan areas 
(Marston 1985). This mobility rate far exceeds the likely unemploy 
ment rate differentials across metropolitan areas. Only a small portion 
of this normal flow of migrants needs to respond to changes in relative 
job growth rates across metropolitan areas for the labor supply change 
to be well-matched to the labor demand change.
Even if local labor supply quickly responds to labor demand shifts, 
economic development policies would still provide the benefit of higher 
land values. Increased local demand and supply of labor would increase 
both business and residential demand for land. The price of existing 
houses and buildings would increase. Land would be bid away from 
other uses (e.g., agriculture or speculation) and devoted to new residen 
tial and commercial development to accommodate the new businesses 
and residents. Even with this increase in developed land supply, the 
price of existing land would remain at a permanently higher level, as 
existing land presumably has some locational advantages over the newly 
developed land. Unlike the case of labor, sufficient land cannot "migrate 
in" to a local area to force land prices back down to their original level.
The benefits of higher land values lack the political or ethical appeal 
of the benefits of lower unemployment. Land is disproportionately owned 
by upper-income groups, so land value benefits would be distributed 
"regressively": the percentage increase in real income would be greater 
for upper-income groups than for lower-income groups. If land value 
increases are the only benefits of state and local economic development 
policies, it is questionable whether anyone other than property owners 
should be required to pay for these policies. Furthermore, in this case 
economic development policies would be unable to help solve the social
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problems of unemployment and poverty among minorities and other 
disadvantaged groups.
My argument for long-run labor market effects of local job growth 
is that what happens to people in the short run affects their long-run 
prospects. Suppose that an increase in local job growth leads, in the 
short run, to some currently unemployed residents getting jobs that they 
otherwise would not have obtained. These currently unemployed 
residents have a short-run advantage over potential in-migrants because 
in-migration does take some time to respond to shifts in labor demand. 
Because these current residents obtain jobs in the short run, they ac 
quire skills that increase their employability and real wages in the long 
run, even after migration has had a chance to fully respond to the in 
creased labor demand.
This dependence of a long-run equilibrium in this case, the long- 
run equilibrium unemployment rate of individuals on past history has 
been labeled hysteresis. Hysteresis was originally used in physics to 
describe how the electromagnetic characteristics of certain metals are 
permanently affected by the temporary application of certain magnetic 
forces. 8 More recently, some economists have suggested that an 
economy's equilibrium unemployment rate may be permanently increas 
ed by a temporary recession, or lowered by a temporary boom. If this 
is true, then macroeconomic policies that affect the short-run perfor 
mance of an economy may also affect its long-run performance. The 
issue of whether equilibrium unemployment exhibits hysteresis has im 
plications much broader than simply who benefits from state and local 
economic development policies.
The new empirical results of this book support the hypothesis that 
labor markets are subject to hysteresis effects. The results are based 
on analysis of average unemployment rates, occupational wage rates, 
and housing and other prices for 25 metropolitan areas from 1972 to 
1986, and on analysis of the labor market success of 44,000 adult males 
in 89 metropolitan areas from 1979 to 1986. The results, extensively 
presented in four chapters of the book, can be briefly summarized here. 
The data suggest that a once-and-for-all shock to a metropolitan area's 
employment that is, a shock that temporarily affects the employment 
growth rate but permanently affects the employment level lowers the
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area's unemployment rate and raises labor force participation rates for 
at least eight years after the shock. Holding occupation constant, real 
wages are unchanged. Individuals with given education and experience 
are more likely to be promoted to higher-paying occupations in 
metropolitan economies that experience higher growth, however, and 
this upgrading in occupational status persists well after the temporary 
shock to growth has subsided. The effects of local growth on real earn 
ings are highest for blacks and for less-educated workers. Local growth 
also raises property values; overall, however, it appears that faster local 
growth is likely to have a progressive impact on the income distribu 
tion. The percentage increase in real income is greatest for low-income 
groups, even accounting for the regressive distribution of the benefits 
from increased property values.
Can State and Local Economic Development Policies 
Benefit the National Economy?
I firmly believe that state government must resist the temptation 
to intervene directly in economic decisions of the marketplace. It 
is certainly true that the combination of reduced federal support 
for state and local programs and the devastating impact of our re 
cent recessions has put enormous pressure on state governments 
to "do something." The reality, however, is that state actions have 
not always increased the country's net investment. On a national 
scale, the impact of state economic development initiatives on U.S. 
economic activity is dominated by monetary, fiscal, and trade deci 
sions at the federal level. States, therefore, are merely competing 
at the margins with one another for their share of new investment. 
Little or no net gain for the United States as a whole is attained 
from these programs. (Ralph E. Bailey, chairman and chief ex 
ecutive officer, Conoco, Inc., memorandum of dissent on pages 
88-89 of Leadership for Dynamic State Economies, Committee for 
Economic Development, 1986)
The argument is often made, as Bailey does in the above quotation, 
that state and local economic development policies are, even at best, 
a zero-sum game from a national perspective. It is argued that even if
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economic development policies succeed in increasing growth in one area, 
this growth is merely transferred from some other area, and overall 
national growth is unaffected. The lower unemployment and higher 
wages in one area are offset by the higher unemployment and lower 
wages in other areas.
My argument against this "zero-sum" game position is twofold. First, 
even if it were true that state and local economic development policies 
just reshuffled jobs among geographic areas, such reshuffling may benefit 
the nation. Individuals vary in the dollar value they place on getting 
a job, which determines how high a wage they will require in order 
to accept a job. For example, individuals may place a higher value on 
obtaining a job that is, are willing to accept a very low wage if they 
have few other income sources. Individuals may place a lower value 
on obtaining a job if they feel they make good use of their time outside 
the wage labor market, such as taking care of children. In low- 
unemployment areas, most individuals who place a high value on get 
ting a job will get one fairly quickly. In high-unemployment areas, many 
individuals who place a high value on getting a job will remain 
unemployed for a long time. As a result, the average unemployed in 
dividual in high-unemployment areas will "need" a job more in the 
sense of placing a higher dollar value on getting one than the average 
unemployed individual in low-unemployment areas. High-unemployment 
areas will benefit more from an additional job than low-unemployment 
areas, as the social benefits from hiring the average unemployed per 
son are higher.
The vigor with which states and governments pursue economic 
development probably reflects these differences in the social benefits 
of reducing unemployment. Common sense suggests that high- 
unemployment states and localities will face greater political pressures 
to expand economic development policies. The scanty empirical evidence 
suggests that high-unemployment areas respond to these pressures by 
more aggressively pursuing economic development. The competitive 
game of state and local economic development probably helps redistribute 
jobs to the most needy areas.
Second, state and local competition for jobs may increase national 
growth. Higher subsidies in many local areas for expanded business
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output and employment may reduce the average national unemployment 
rate and increase output. In addition, the transfer of jobs from low- 
unemployment regions to high-unemployment regions may reduce in 
flationary pressures and allow national policymakers to achieve lower 
national unemployment and higher output without increasing inflation. 
One potential negative effect of state and local competition for jobs 
is that the national distribution of income may become more regressive, 
that is, more income may go to the rich instead of the poor. Competi 
tion for jobs may lead to reduced taxes on business owners. Wealthy 
business owners may benefit. But policymakers should offset these 
benefits for the rich by making the federal tax system more progressive, 
rather than by attempting to eliminate competition for jobs.
Is the Glass Half-Full or Half-Empty?
The focus of this book is on how state and local economic develop 
ment policies can potentially provide benefits. This focus is necessary 
because the prevailing intellectual assessment of these policies is too 
negative. It should not, however, be interpreted as a blanket endorse 
ment of all state and local economic development policies.
Empirical evidence presented here suggests that the benefits and costs 
of state and local economic development policies will often be close. 
Net benefits of economic development policies are most likely to be 
positive in areas of high unemployment and for programs that have large 
effects on business location, expansion, and start-up decisions per dollar 
of government spending.
Organization of the Book
The remainder of the book presents these arguments in more detail. 
Chapter 2 reviews what previous research shows about how state and 
local public policies affect business growth.
Chapters 3 through 7 develop the broad theme of the book: how 
metropolitan growth affects different groups in the population. Chapter
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3 presents the theory of likely distributional effects of local growth. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present empirical estimates of the effects of 
metropolitan growth on unemployment rates and other measures of labor 
market activities, prices, and wages. Chapter 7 examines the overall 
effect of growth on real earnings, and uses these results to simulate 
the likely quantitative magnitude of the distributional and efficiency ef 
fects of local growth.
Chapter 8 considers whether state and local economic development 
efforts help the national economy. Chapter 9 concludes with a discus 
sion of the broader implications of these results for macroeconomic 
policy, antipoverty policy, and the role of local areas in national policy.
NOTES
1. The theoretical analysis of the book may also apply to groupings of counties in nonmetropolitan 
areas that constitute true regional labor and housing markets. Virtually none of the empirical work 
of the book deals with these nonmetropolitan economic regions, however, so extrapolation of 
the findings to nonmetropolitan areas is more uncertain.
2.1 refer here to such recent books as Laboratories of Democracy, by journalist David Osborne 
(1988), or The Wealth of States, by several policy analysts associated with the Council of State 
Planning and Policy Agencies (Vaughan, Pollard, and Dyer 1985). Both these books argue against 
traditional economic development policies and in favor of some new wave economic develop 
ment policies. A more scholarly account of this debate is provided by political scientist Peter 
Eisinger, in his comprehensive book on state and local economic development, The Rise of the 
Entrepreneurial State (Eisinger 1988). Case studies of how this debate has been resolved so far 
in various states are provided in The New Economic Role of American States, edited by Scott 
Fosler of the Committee for Economic Development, a national business think tank (Fosler 1988).
3. Eisinger (1988), p. 10.
4. Vaughan, Pollard, and Dyer, in their book The Wealth of States, are certainly aware of the 
political importance of creating jobs. One of their arguments for a greater focus on new wave 
economic development policies is that such policies are more effective than traditional economic 
development policies in creating jobs in the long run: ". . . in the long run, employment oppor 
tunities and wealth will be greater under an entrepreneurial strategy than under any alternative 
approach to development" (Vaughan, Pollard, and Dyer 1985, p. 128). Osborne also makes similar 
arguments in his book: "Businesses that fail to innovate do not last long; regional economies 
in which innovation does not flourish quickly stagnate." (Osborne 1988, p. 252).
5. These Michigan figures come from a report by the Citizens Research Council of Michigan 
(1986). Michigan is the only state I know of that keeps track of the volume of property tax abatements 
throughout the state.
6. These Tennessee figures come from a paper by Bartik, Becker, Lake, and Bush (1987). The 
figures are based on the in lieu of tax agreement between Maury County and Saturn, and on in 
formation from the Tennessee Department of Economic and Community Development on state 
expenditures on roads and job training for the Saturn plant. Stating the subsidy in present value 
terms is an appropriate way of emphasizing the large size of traditional economic development
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subsidies. The present value of some flow over time of subsidies tells us what one-time subsidy, 
given today, would have the same value as that flow of subsidies. If all new manufacturing in 
vestment received the same present value subsidy as Saturn, the resulting flow of subsidies would 
be equivalent to spending $3.4 billion annually on subsidies. Total manufacturing gross invest 
ment in 1985 was $81.8 billion; $144 million times 81.8/3.5 would yield a total present value 
of new subsidy commitments of $3.4 billion. I should note that the Saturn subsidy was not par 
ticularly large for an auto plant; for example, the Kentucky subsidy to its Toyota plant was ap 
parently much greater (Milward and Newman 1989).
7. Hal Hovey, editor of State Policy Reports, has stated that "state tax systems are evolving in 
the direction of [development-oriented] tax policies," which would eventually imply "eliminating 
all state and local taxes paid in operations, such as manufacturing, that have choices of where 
they locate and expand." (Hovey 1986, pp. 94-95). According to Steve Gold, former Director 
of Fiscal Studies of the National Conference of State Legislatures, "Interstate tax competition 
not only remains, but may intensify." (Gold 1988, p. 27).
8. Cross and Allan (1988) discuss the history of the hysteresis concept.
